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Tucker’s 9/11 Documentary Raises Some HUGE Questions

Tucker’s 9/11 Documentary Raises Some HUGE Questions

The Young Turks

554,156 views 10 months ago Save 7 min 14 min read

Video Summary

The first episode of a docuseries explores findings suggesting the CIA facilitated the travel of individuals who later became 9/11 hijackers to the United States. It alleges the CIA attempted to recruit these individuals for a "false flag operation" rather than informing the FBI, a claim supported by documentation and testimony from a former FBI agent who worked at the CIA's "Bin Laden unit." This unit was specifically tasked with tracking al-Qaeda.

The docuseries, through its investigation and interviews, highlights that the CIA intercepted one hijacker in Dubai, discovering his US visa obtained from a consulate reportedly run by a future CIA director. This discovery was allegedly not shared with the FBI, and a report intended for the FBI was blocked by a CIA analyst, who stated it was a "CIA matter." This lack of communication continued as the hijackers entered the U.S. and lived openly in San Diego, with the CIA allegedly using a Saudi national as a proxy for domestic spying.

Further revelations include a former White House counterterrorism official's claim that the CIA was running a "false flag operation" to recruit hijackers, a statement that was met with denial but not a direct refutation from a former CIA director. The 9/11 Commission's investigation into this matter was reportedly blocked. The series suggests significant failures and a lack of transparency from intelligence agencies regarding how the attacks occurred, with many questions remaining unanswered.

Short Highlights

  • The CIA allegedly attempted to recruit 9/11 hijackers for a "false flag operation" instead of informing the FBI.
  • Two of the 9/11 hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Al-Madar, were able to travel to the United States with visas issued by the US consulate in Saudi Arabia, a consulate reportedly overseen by John Brennan.
  • A CIA analyst blocked a report intended for the FBI, stating the matter was a "CIA matter" and not for the FBI to know.
  • The CIA reportedly used a Saudi national, Omar Al-Bayumi, as a proxy to spy on the hijackers once they arrived in the U.S., providing them with housing and financial assistance.
  • The 9/11 Commission's investigation into these intelligence failures was allegedly blocked by its executive director at the behest of Condoleezza Rice.

Key Details

CIA's Alleged Role in Facilitating Hijacker Travel [00:00]

  • Anyone questioning the official narrative is labeled negatively and censored.
  • Leaders who failed on 9/11 used the attacks to expand their powers.
  • Findings revealed the apparent role of former CIA director John Brennan in helping 9/11 hijackers come to the U.S.
  • The CIA allegedly went to "remarkable lengths" to protect hijackers from the FBI.
  • There was a duty to protect Americans that was failed due to a delusion of recruiting someone within a cell.

This section introduces the premise that dissenting voices are silenced and that the 9/11 attacks were used to expand governmental powers. It directly states shocking findings about the CIA's involvement in the presence of 9/11 hijackers in the U.S. and their alleged protection from the FBI.

"Anyone who doubts the official narrative is cast as a cook, a criminal, a fringe conspiracy theorist, and punished. They've been blacklisted and censored and banned."

Docuseries Overview and Key Claims [00:52]

  • The first episode of a 9/11 docuseries by Tucker Carlson is presented as worth watching.
  • The episode focuses on the CIA's intelligence gathering operation, its lack of communication with the FBI, and the facilitation of travel for 9/11 hijackers to the U.S.
  • The speaker was unaware of this information until watching the episode and found it informative and backed by documentation.
  • The CIA allegedly tried to recruit two hijackers for a "false flag operation" instead of informing the FBI.
  • The claim is described as bold, and the speaker was initially skeptical but convinced by corroborating documentation and interviews.

This section sets the stage for the docuseries, outlining its central focus on alleged CIA actions and the speaker's personal journey from skepticism to belief based on the presented evidence.

"So, I didn't know about that until watching um this first episode. And I think it was informative. It was backed up by documentation that was provided by Tucker Carlson."

Mark Rossini's Testimony and the CIA's "Bin Laden Unit" [02:02]

  • The docuseries interviewed Mark Rossini, a former FBI agent from January 1999 to May 2003.
  • Rossini worked as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force representative at the CIA headquarters' "Alex station."
  • The "Alex station" was known as the "Bin Laden unit" and operated from 1996 to 2005.
  • Its sole purpose was to track and monitor Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11.
  • Rossini claims the FBI was unaware of the CIA allegedly recruiting 9/11 hijackers as informants to learn more about al-Qaeda.

This part introduces a key witness, Mark Rossini, and his role within the CIA, highlighting the existence of a specialized unit focused on al-Qaeda, and raising the first direct allegations of the CIA's covert actions regarding potential hijackers.

"So, the Bin Laden issue station was like a dedicated unit within the CIA that operated from 1996 to 2005. and its sole role, its sole purpose was to track and monitor Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11."

CIA Spying on al-Qaeda and the "Hatada" [03:22]

  • Beginning in 1996, the CIA and NSA spied on al-Qaeda through a communication hub known as the "Hatada" in Yemen.
  • Neither the FBI nor Mark Rossini were informed about this communications hub that the CIA discovered.
  • The "Hatada" was where al-Qaeda terrorists and affiliates would gather.
  • The CIA was spying on this hub.
  • The "Hatada" was also the home of the father-in-law of Khaled al-Midar, one of the 9/11 hijackers.

This section details the initial intelligence gathering efforts by the CIA and NSA on al-Qaeda, emphasizing the secrecy of their operations and the direct connection of this hub to one of the future hijackers.

"So the hot home is where they would gather al-Qaeda terrorists or affiliate affiliates of al-Qaeda. They'd gather there and the CIA knew about it and so they were spying in on the home."

The Malaysia Summit and the Intercepted Passport [04:16]

  • Before 9/11, a summit for al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists was planned in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
  • One of the 9/11 hijackers, Khaled al-Midar, planned to attend by flying from Yemen to Dubai to Malaysia.
  • The CIA intercepted Al-Midar in Dubai and searched his hotel room.
  • His passport was found, and pictures were taken, revealing a visa to the United States issued from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
  • Court filings state these visas were issued to facilitate an operation run by the Saudis and the CIA spying operation.

This part highlights a critical moment where a future hijacker was identified and his travel plans, including a U.S. visa, were discovered by the CIA, linking the visa issuance to a joint Saudi and CIA operation.

"And lo and behold, in his passport is a visa to go to United States of America issued out of the American consulate in Jedha, Saudi Arabia."

John Brennan and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah [05:37]

  • The CIA continued tracking Al-Midar to Kuala Lumpur, where he met with Nawaf Al-Hazmi, another future 9/11 hijacker.
  • The two hijackers obtained visas from the U.S. consulate in Saudi Arabia.
  • The station chief in Riyadh at the time, responsible for this consulate, was future CIA director John Brennan.
  • The documentation and Mark Rossini clearly lay out how these hijackers legally entered the U.S. through visas provided by the U.S. consulate in Jeddah.

This section directly implicates John Brennan in the process of visa issuance to the hijackers through his reported role at the consulate, emphasizing the legal path taken by these individuals into the U.S.

"And that's the consulate that was run by John Brennan."

CIA Cable and Blocked FBI Notification [07:10]

  • An FBI colleague of Rossini, Doug Miller, approached him about a CIA cable received by the FBI.
  • Miller believed they needed to inform the FBI bureau about a U.S.-Saudi intelligence operation.
  • Rossini agreed, and Miller wrote a Central Intelligence Report (CIR), which Rossini approved.
  • The CIR went to CIA analyst Michael Anne Casey, but it "sat in her queue" for days without moving.
  • Casey told Rossini it was "not an FBI matter" and that the CIA would inform the FBI "when and if we want them to know."

This segment details a specific instance of deliberate obstruction, where a report intended to inform the FBI about crucial intelligence was held up and deliberately kept from them by a CIA analyst.

"She said, 'Because it's not FBI, not an FBI matter. What is an FBI matter? So, it's a CIA matter and when and if we want the FBI to know, we will tell them and you are not to say anything.'"

Hijackers' Entry into the U.S. and CIA Cover-up [09:23]

  • On January 8th, 2000, CIA surveillance reported Al-Midar boarded a flight to Bangkok with Alhazmi.
  • The official account stated the trail went cold, but the CIA placed their names on a watchlist.
  • Three months later, Thai authorities reported Alhazmi and Al-Midar had boarded a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles.
  • The CIA tracked these two individuals globally and into America, yet did not inform the FBI.
  • This lack of notification is deemed "insane" given the FBI's role in investigating domestic issues.

This part focuses on the physical arrival of the hijackers in the United States, highlighting the CIA's awareness of their presence and continued failure to notify the FBI, which is presented as a significant dereliction of duty.

"The two hijackers had arrived in the United States. You have the CIA then following one man and then two men all over the planet and then eventually even to America, right? Landing in Los Angeles, California. And you don't tell the FBI, guys. That's insane."

Richard Clarke's Claims and Blocked Investigation [11:06]

  • A recently released court filing reveals former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke told investigators the CIA was running a "false flag operation" to recruit hijackers.
  • When Clarke made this claim publicly, he received an angry call from former CIA director George Tenet, who did not deny the allegations but stated the CIA was not recruiting hijackers, calling it false rumors.
  • Philip Zelico, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, reportedly blocked the commission's investigation into this matter at the behest of Condoleezza Rice.
  • The 9/11 Commission's report does not include information about this clandestine CIA intelligence gathering operation.

This section brings in high-level testimony and accusations of a cover-up, suggesting that even attempts to investigate these issues were actively thwarted, further obscuring the full truth.

"According to a recently released court filing, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke told government investigators that the quote CIA was running a false flag operation to recruit the hijackers."

Redacted CIA Operative and Withheld Documents [13:12]

  • The CIA allegedly blocked the commission from investigating the CIA operative attempting to recruit the hijackers.
  • This operative is referred to as "VVV" in documentation, with their name redacted for anonymity.
  • Tucker Carlson argues for transparency and more details about this operative.
  • The commission investigators did not question CIA director George Tenet about the al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia or the CIA blocking the FBI.
  • This lack of investigation means the official 9/11 report doesn't mention the CIA's plan to recruit hijackers as informants.

This part emphasizes the continued secrecy surrounding the operation, with the identity of a key CIA operative redacted and the 9/11 Commission failing to delve into crucial aspects of the intelligence failures.

"The CIA blocked the commission from investigating the CIA operative who was attempting to recruit the hijackers. We don't know who that CIA operative is because in all the documentation that person is simply referred to as VVV."

Hijackers' Life in the U.S. and Omar Al-Bayumi [14:04]

  • The 9/11 hijackers, Alhazmi and Al-Madar, lived openly in the U.S. using their real names, listed in the San Diego phone book for over a year before 9/11.
  • Upon arrival, they met Omar Al-Bayumi in Los Angeles; the CIA used Al-Bayumi to spy on the hijackers, as domestic spying was prohibited for the CIA.
  • Al-Bayumi's notebook contained an airplane drawing and flight calculations, which the 9/11 Commission investigators never saw.
  • Al-Bayumi had a "no-show" job at a Saudi aviation contractor and was receiving substantial money from the Saudi embassy in Washington, D.C., funneled from accounts belonging to the wife of the Saudi ambassador.
  • The CIA used the Saudis as a proxy to recruit hijackers, providing themselves with cover to blame the Saudi government if things went wrong.

This section details the hijackers' seemingly ordinary lives in the U.S. and the suspicious activities of Omar Al-Bayumi, who acted as a conduit and facilitator, allegedly at the CIA's behest, further implicating Saudi connections and potential CIA maneuverings.

"The CIA was using Al Bayumi um to spy for them and gather intelligence on the hijackers because again at the time the CIA was not allowed to engage in domestic spying."

Al-Bayumi's Facilitation and USS Cole Bombing Connection [16:10]

  • Al-Bayumi convinced the hijackers to move to San Diego, co-signed their apartment lease, paid their first month's rent and security deposit.
  • He also helped them obtain driver's licenses and introduced them to radical Muslims in the area, including Anwar al-Awlaki.
  • Al-Midar was able to re-enter the U.S. on a multi-visit visa after traveling to Yemen.
  • Shortly before his re-entry, the FBI and CIA met to discuss the bombing of the USS Cole, an event Al-Midar was involved in, which killed 17 U.S. soldiers.
  • When an FBI agent showed a photo of Al-Midar from the Malaysia summit to the CIA, they refused to identify him.

This part highlights Al-Bayumi's extensive support for the hijackers and a critical missed opportunity where the CIA refused to identify a known accomplice in a deadly attack to the FBI, underscoring the persistent lack of inter-agency cooperation.

"The FBI had a picture of Almadar that was taken at the summit in Malaysia. The agent asked the CIA if they knew who the man was and the CIA refused to tell him."

CIA's Late Notification and FBI Failures [17:40]

  • The CIA finally alerted the FBI about the situation in August 2001, but it was too late, as 9/11 happened soon after.
  • The theory is that the CIA operation spiraled out of control, but the FBI also had its own failures.
  • While Alhazmi and Al-Midar were in California, they spent time living with an FBI informant named Abdu Sat.
  • Carlson claims the FBI was never informed about this.
  • The overall read of the episode suggests the CIA intentionally hid its operation from the FBI.

This section acknowledges that while the CIA's alleged operation backfired, the FBI also had its own shortcomings. It reiterates the core claim that the CIA's actions were intentionally concealed from the FBI, contributing to the catastrophic events.

"The theory is that the CIA operation had spun out of control. But the FBI also, I want to be clear, had their own failures."

Unanswered Questions and Need for Transparency [19:09]

  • The CIA's operation, intended to gather information through hijackers as informants, backfired significantly.
  • Many documents are still withheld from the public, even 24 years after 9/11.
  • There is a call for more transparency and clarity regarding how the largest terror attack on U.S. soil occurred, given the multitude of intelligence agencies and surveillance.
  • The docuseries episode is described as enlightening and the CIA is suggested to have "a lot to answer for."
  • The 9/11 Commission was reportedly underfunded and not given all necessary information from intelligence organizations, setting it up to fail.

This concluding section emphasizes the lingering mysteries and the demand for accountability, pointing to the withholding of information and the perceived inadequacy of the 9/11 Commission as major issues that still need to be addressed.

"There's still so much that we don't know because there are documents that are being withheld from the American people even though 9/11 happened 24 years ago."

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